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We have recently witnessed two dramatic advances in the
capabilities of forensic genetics. First, the use of public
genealogy databases to identify criminals (as publicized by
the Golden State Killer case), and secondly, the advancing
science of trait prediction in forensic investigations. Just as
the 1995 OJ Simpson murder trial brought the existence of
DNA forensics (and some of its shortcomings) into the public
consciousness,1 in our opinion, these two developments,
23 years later, mark the start of a new era in forensic genetics.
These nascent capabilities raise issues of privacy and
consent that extend well beyond forensics. Significant public
concern has already been reported surrounding access and
use of genetic data,2 but the discourse around the introduction
of genetic genealogy and phenotyping approaches has
been limited, disjointed, and unfocused. As forensic genetics
and medical genetics converge toward genome sequencing,
issues surrounding genetic data become increasingly inter-
twined—and cannot be viewed in isolation. What happens
to our genetic data in one realm, such as forensics, is highly
likely to affect how society trusts the use of genetic data in
medicine. The speed of these developments has surprised
many and demands a policy response to protect trust in
medical genetics.
POLICE GENEALOGY
Since the high-profile arrest of the alleged Golden State Killer,
police around the world are digging through their freezers
looking for samples.3 One company has launched a “Genetic
Genealogy” service to commercialize the technique. The first
100 samples run through their system reportedly yielded
20 strong matches, several of whom have already been
arrested.4
Traditionally, forensic databases used around 20 markers,
which only allowed direct matches or close family relation-
ships to be inferred. In the Golden State Killer case, police
took DNA from a crime scene and generated the same kind of
data as consumer ancestry companies. These companies use
“SNP chips” that read around 700,000 markers and are
dramatically more powerful for making genealogical infer-
ences. Police then created a profile and searched the data
against GEDmatch, a publicly accessible genealogy database
of genetic information shared by people pursuing an interest
in genealogy, including searching for long-lost relatives.
Police did not match close relatives but made a number
of third and fourth cousin matches. We have around 190
third cousins in an average family.5 Our genetic connections
to these distant relatives mean that the actions of people
we have never met have put many of us within reach of
this new law enforcement tool. One approximation suggests
over 90% of the American population with European
ancestry already has a third cousin in GEDmatch, which
has around a million users. Accessing the data on a larger
system, such as AncestryDNA (~10 million users), puts that
estimate at 98%6.
GEDmatch users (prior to the adjusted terms and
conditions) did not specifically and knowingly consent to
the use of their genealogy data by law enforcement. Even if
individuals do consent to this use, their family members
might not. Consent given by one person should not bind
others.
Genomic databases already have a diversity problem.7
Police genealogy will likely exacerbate existing biases by
increasing fear and distrust of genetics in minority groups.
Police genealogy also goes to the heart of the broader issue
of surveillance, and the extent to which we are prepared to
sacrifice our privacy to enforce the law.
PREDICTIVE FORENSIC GENETICS
Ethical and legal frameworks around forensic genetics are
heavily influenced by the “noncoding” nature of the current
markers, which have little connection to physical traits
(except sex determination). Forensics is in the process of a
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dramatic shift from these “noncoding” DNA fingerprinting
methods, to tests that tell us much more about a suspect.
Several companies are offering “DNA phenotyping” ser-
vices. Parabon Nanolabs (Virginia) predicts skin, eye, and hair
color, freckles, ancestry, and face shape, producing a DNA
“mugshot”. DNA phenotyping has been used in the Nether-
lands, France, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and
several US states, although in many countries there is little
legislation regulating its use (but see8).
Outsourcing forensic services to private companies such
as Parabon raises questions about governance and oversight.
The generation of sensitive genetic data, especially by
nongovernmental agencies, also raises questions about
security, use, and access. Are warrants required to access it?
Is the data destroyed if a suspect is found not guilty? Is
deletion even feasible given data retention requirements
of laboratory certification? Transnational transfer of genetic
data outside its original jurisdiction can also result in a loss
of legal protection, although there are some protections for
the international transfer of personal information (i.e.,
restrictions in the Privacy Act in Australia, and under the
General Data Protection Regulations [GDPR] in Europe).
The science behind predicting physical features from DNA
is advancing rapidly, but the ability of current approaches has
been hotly debated in the scientific community9 (also see
Erlich unpublished preprint https://www.biorxiv.org/content/
early/2017/09/07/185330.1). The methods and algorithms
that underpin commercial phenotyping services have not
been published and have largely escaped scientific scrutiny.
How can we trust the accuracy of the algorithms when no
one has the ability to view the code or verify the results?
Predicting physical features from genetic data works
better for some ethnicities than others. For example, traits
like eye and hair color are relatively invariant in Korean
populations, making current phenotyping tools less useful.
Researchers in that country are considering predictive tests
for other, nonphysical traits such as propensity to drink, or
likelihood to smoke.10 This raises the ethical question of
where the line is drawn, and what traits we allow to be
predicted.11 Predisposition to diabetes, Marfan syndrome,
obesity, schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and personality
traits, among others, have been suggested as potential
phenotypes that could be implemented in the future
(despite ethical concerns).12
Making medical or behavioral predictions raises issues of
disclosure and prejudice that have received little attention.
If law enforcement finds that a suspect has a high risk of
a disease are they obliged to tell them, or should they
respect the “right not to know”? Would law enforcement
need expertise in genetic counseling, or would this require a
liaison between law and health services? Currently these
methods are mostly used to generate leads, and not presented
as evidence in court. If this kind of information was disclosed,
however, then how might it affect jurors in a trial? Could
it even be used in support of the defense or prosecution’s
case? If so, what level of confidence would be required given
that genetic inferences are generally probabilistic rather than
deterministic?
THE NEED FOR GENETIC DATA PROTECTION
These developments illustrate two major issues. Police
genealogy shows how one person’s decision about their
genetic data can impact not only close relatives, but distant
ones. DNA phenotyping highlights how much sensitive
information is contained in our genetic data.
Some jurisdictions have made provisions allowing the use
of health information by law enforcement in circumstances
deemed to be reasonable. Genomics alliances around the
world are generating genomic information from millions
of individuals. Genetic information generated in a health
setting must be protected, and not become a forensic resource,
to ensure public confidence in medical genomics.
Attempts have been made to limit genetic discrimination
by some jurisdictions, but the developments outlined here
suggest that policy should focus on the thing we need to
protect—genetic data.
The creation of a Genetic Data Protection Act would
provide governance on the broad issues of access, storage, and
use of genetic data. Our view is that genetic data is different
from other data. It contains highly sensitive information that
is unique to us. If our genetic data is compromised we cannot
request a new genome. Genetic data is very difficult or
impossible to anonymize, particularly as our ability to predict
physical traits becomes more refined. What happens to
our genetic data affects not only us, but our relatives, and
consequences extend to subsequent generations. Genetic data
needs more protection than other types of data. Individual
ownership of digital genetic data is a fundamental right that
a Genetic Data Protection Act should grant.
Ownership of genetic data needs to be different from
standard property rights. It should be immutable and
nontransferrable. The issues around use of our genetic data
are complex, and vulnerable individuals (and their descen-
dants) must be protected. It must not be possible for an
individual to unwittingly sign an agreement that results in
loss of control of their genetic data. These rights must also
be provided in a way that preserves existing protections
against the patenting of human genes. Genetic data is often
spread across many jurisdictions, so protection would
preferably be granted internationally. Ideally this would be
through international treaty, but other mechanisms for
extraterritorial protections have recently been demonstrated
with the creation of the European GDPR.
As the technology for not only reading, but also editing
DNA improves, the issue of ownership is only going to
become more important. The law is already failing to catch up
to advances in genetic technology. In establishing protection
for genetic data, future technological advances and potential
uses or misuses must be considered.
Discussions about the use of genetic data have been
happening for almost two decades, and limited protections
have been granted, in some jurisdictions (e.g., the Genetic
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Information Nondiscrimination Act in the United States). In
some instances, excellent proposals have been made, but not
implemented.13 Several international declarations have been
made by UNESCO on the governance of human genetic data,
but these guidelines need to be translated into local law for
genetic data to be fully protected. The new era of forensic
genetics exposes the inadequacy of current legislation and
should be the catalyst for granting full and proper protection
to our most personal information.
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